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Proposed Anti Privileged Access arms trading legislation

Aggravated Public Trust Military Arms Diversion Act
Publication timestamp: February 11, 2026 (America/Los_Angeles)
Document type: Draft bill text (legislation-ready format)

A BILL

To amend title 18, United States Code, to establish enhanced criminal penalties for the unlawful diversion of controlled military arms by public officials acting under color of law or by virtue of official clearance, licensing, or restricted access, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,


SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Aggravated Public Trust Military Arms Diversion Act”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.

(a) Findings. Congress finds the following:

  1. The diversion of controlled military arms by persons entrusted with public authority constitutes a grave breach of public trust.
  2. Access to restricted defense articles is granted based on clearance, oath, licensing, credentialing, or official duty and is not generally available to the public.
  3. The unlawful transfer of controlled military arms to unauthorized persons creates a foreseeable and catastrophic risk to public safety and national security.
  4. When such diversion is undertaken with specific intent to facilitate lethal violence, or in furtherance of violent subversion, it constitutes an offense of heightened gravity against the public order.

(b) Purpose. The purpose of this Act is—

  1. to deter and punish abuse of official access to controlled military arms;
  2. to establish enhanced penalties for aggravated diversion offenses committed by covered persons;
  3. to provide capital eligibility only in circumstances consistent with constitutional requirements, including specific intent to facilitate lethal violence and resulting death; and
  4. to ensure federal jurisdiction is available to prosecute such conduct regardless of the governmental level of the covered person.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act, the following definitions apply:

(1) Covered person. The term “covered person” means any individual who, at the time of the offense—

  1. is a Federal officer, employee, agent, or contractor;
  2. is a State, local, or Tribal officer, employee, agent, or contractor;
  3. is a law enforcement officer of any governmental level;
  4. is a member of the Armed Forces, including a member of a reserve component or National Guard when acting under Federal authority;
  5. acts under color of law; or
  6. is granted security clearance, restricted licensing, credentialing, access authorization, or other non-public access to controlled military arms by virtue of position, oath, commission, credential, contract, or official assignment.

(2) Controlled military arms. The term “controlled military arms” means—

  1. a defense article on the United States Munitions List (as in effect on the date of the offense);
  2. a machinegun, destructive device, or firearm described in chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, that is restricted from public sale or subject to heightened controls;
  3. crew-served weapons, heavy weapons, or weapon systems, including components and essential parts;
  4. military explosives, explosive components, or detonating mechanisms;
  5. military-grade suppressors, optics, night-vision devices, thermal devices, fire control devices, or other restricted combat-enabling equipment as determined by the Attorney General by regulation; or
  6. any weapon, weapon component, or controlled combat-enabling equipment transferred to, issued to, or held by law enforcement or other covered persons through Federal or State surplus, transfer, lending, or grant programs.

(3) Diversion. The term “diversion” means any knowing unauthorized transfer, sale, barter, conveyance, delivery, facilitation of transfer, or attempted transfer of controlled military arms to an unauthorized person, including—

  1. circumventing regulatory safeguards or inventory controls;
  2. concealing, falsifying, or manipulating records, logs, or serial-number documentation;
  3. mislabeling, ghosting, or off-booking controlled military arms; or
  4. using official systems, restricted facilities, or controlled access channels to effect an unauthorized transfer.

(4) Specific intent to facilitate lethal violence. The term “specific intent to facilitate lethal violence” means a conscious objective or purpose to enable conduct that the actor intends, expects, or is reasonably certain will result in the death of one or more persons.

(5) Unauthorized person. The term “unauthorized person” means any person who is not lawfully entitled under Federal law to receive, possess, or control the controlled military arms at issue, including any person receiving such arms outside authorized governmental channels, approvals, and controls.

SEC. 4. OFFENSE OF AGGRAVATED PUBLIC TRUST DIVERSION OF CONTROLLED MILITARY ARMS.

(a) In general. A covered person commits the offense of Aggravated Public Trust Diversion of Controlled Military Arms if the covered person—

  1. knowingly accesses, obtains, removes, checks out, requisitions, or otherwise acquires controlled military arms by virtue of official position, clearance, licensing, credentialing, or restricted non-public access;
  2. knowingly engages in diversion of such controlled military arms;
  3. acts for personal gain, to benefit another person, to benefit a criminal enterprise, or in coordination with one or more persons; and
  4. commits an overt act in furtherance of the diversion.

(b) Attempt and facilitation. Whoever attempts, conspires, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, procures, or willfully causes the commission of an offense under this section shall be punishable as a principal.

SEC. 5. AGGRAVATING FACTORS; ENHANCED OFFENSE CLASSIFICATION.

(a) Aggravating factors. An offense under section 4 shall be classified as an Aggravated Offense if one or more of the following factors is proven beyond a reasonable doubt:

  1. The diversion was undertaken in conspiracy with one or more persons.
  2. The covered person exploited classified systems, restricted facilities, secure databases, evidence rooms, armories, or other protected channels to accomplish the diversion.
  3. The covered person knew or intended that the recipient would use the controlled military arms in a violent felony.
  4. The diversion materially supported a criminal enterprise, a transnational criminal organization, terrorism, violent subversion, or insurrectionary activity.
  5. The diversion involved multiple weapons, repeated transfers, or trafficking as a business pattern.
  6. Serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the diverted controlled military arms.

(b) Rule of construction. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit prosecution under any other provision of Federal law, including provisions relating to firearms offenses, explosives offenses, terrorism, racketeering, public corruption, or homicide.

SEC. 6. PENALTIES.

(a) Base offense penalty. A covered person convicted under section 4, without proof of an aggravating factor under section 5(a), shall be imprisoned for not less than 25 years and up to life, fined under this title, or both.

(b) Aggravated offense penalty; life without parole. A covered person convicted under section 4 where one or more aggravating factors under section 5(a) is proven beyond a reasonable doubt shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, and may be fined under this title.

(c) Capital eligibility. A covered person shall be eligible for capital punishment only if the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that—

  1. the covered person acted with specific intent to facilitate lethal violence;
  2. a death resulted directly from the diversion, attempted diversion, or facilitation of diversion; and
  3. the causal connection between the diversion and the resulting death satisfies the standards applicable to capital offenses under Federal law.

(1) Procedure. Any sentence of death under this Act shall be imposed only in compliance with the procedures and requirements of chapter 228 of title 18, United States Code.

(d) No limitation. The penalties in this section are in addition to any other penalty authorized by law, including for homicide, terrorism, racketeering, bribery, obstruction, or public corruption.

SEC. 7. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES; FORFEITURE; DISQUALIFICATION.

(a) Mandatory forfeiture. Upon conviction under this Act, the court shall order forfeiture of—

  1. any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the offense; and
  2. any property used or intended to be used to commit or facilitate the offense, to the extent permitted by law.

(b) Public benefits and retirement consequences. Upon conviction under this Act, the defendant shall be permanently disqualified, to the maximum extent permitted by law, from receiving any pension, annuity, or retirement benefit derived from public employment that was materially connected to the official authority, clearance, licensing, or access used to commit the offense.

(c) Disqualification from public service. Upon conviction under this Act, the defendant shall be permanently disqualified from holding any Federal office or employment, and from receiving or maintaining any Federal security clearance or Federal firearms credential, as applicable.

SEC. 8. FEDERAL JURISDICTION; VENUE; CONCURRENT AUTHORITY.

(a) Jurisdiction. The United States shall have jurisdiction over offenses under this Act regardless of whether the covered person is employed or commissioned by a Federal, State, local, or Tribal entity.

(b) Concurrent enforcement. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt State, local, or Tribal authority to prosecute under applicable law, except that no State, local, or Tribal policy, agreement, or declination shall bar federal investigation or prosecution.

(c) Venue. Venue shall lie in any district where—

  1. the diversion occurred;
  2. any overt act in furtherance of the offense occurred;
  3. the controlled military arms were obtained, stored, transported, or delivered; or
  4. any record falsification, concealment, or official system misuse occurred.
SEC. 9. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, and the application of the remaining provisions to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected.

SEC. 10. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment and shall apply to offenses committed on or after that date.


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